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Abstract
Theories of human nature underlie major positions not only in social science but also in the
public sphere and its relationship to inequality. When it comes to Durkheim, his theory of human
nature is often confused with his critiques of intellectual individualism and his historical
argument concerning moral individualism. This paper proposes to analytically separate
Durkheim’s apparently intertwined positions to show Durkheim’s concept of the ‘social
individual’ as found within his theory of human nature. This is the difference between society as
the object of analysis where the individual is slowly expressed historically in regard to the
transition from mechanical to organic solidarity and the conception of the relation between a
human being and the manner in which social solidarity is generally realized in a human being,
considered philosophically. It is with this evidence, this paper will show Durkheim’s concept of
the ‘social’ individual helps illuminate how social life itself is possible.
Introduction
Durkheim deals with many concerns through his work: establishing sociology as a science,
forming a parallel science of morality, examining the roots of solidarity in the division of labor
in varying societies, and investigating the elementary forms of collective representations. In the
explication of these ideas, Durkheim arrives at a concept of the ‘social individual’ as a ‘social
being’. However, due to his own competing agendas, his positivist stance, and strong critiques
against the two different strains of methodological individualism, that of the possessiveness of
Hobbes & Rousseau and that of utilitarians, his own positions become conflated into moral
individualism with the cult of the individual at its core. So, as Durkheim is found doing many
things simultaneously, his ontological and methodological positions, including his theory of
human nature appear intertwined with his epistemological explication of such positions. Thus, to
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illustrate Durkheim’s concept of the ‘social’ individual is to analytical separate his critiques of
methodological individualism from his demonstration of moral individualism as a historical
social fact while showing the development of his theory of human nature throughout his corpus
that is, in itself, analytically distinct from moral individualism.
Methodological Individualism and Durkheim’s Critiques
When the term ‘individual’ is used in a sociological sense, there is an implicit notion of how that
term is being used in relation to a corresponding notion of ‘society’. Methodological
individualism, generally speaking, tries to explain this relation “in terms of individuals and their
interaction.” (Udehn, 2001: 1) In relation to Durkheim, there are two positions that Durkheim
addresses in The Division of Labor in Society and in The Rules of Sociological Method:
possessive individualism and utilitarian individualism. It is important to note that these positions
are theories of human nature, found primarily in philosophy and economics, that Durkheim and
others have taken up as methodological positions in social science. In Durkheim’s goal of
separating sociology from philosophy, he feels it is required of him to address these positions
despite the fact their underlying assumptions, at times, address only indirectly his intended
subject matter of society, which Durkheim often conflated his various uses of the term ‘society’
itself.1 (Cf. Lukes, 1985: 19-21)
Possessive Individualism
Before presenting Durkheim’s critique, it would be of use to briefly summarize the two positions
the critique is aimed at; that of Thomas Hobbes and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. In Leviathan,
Hobbes traced the origins of society to the ‘original state of nature.’ This state of nature was

1

Somewhere, Durkheim also used the term intellectual individualism to refer to this type of
individualism, conflating possessive individualism and utilitarian individualism.
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posited to have existed when individuals lived in a condition in which law and government are
absent where “the life of man is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.” (Hobbes, 1968 [1651]:
186) With this condition as the starting point of analysis, where all that ostensibly exists are
independent human beings, Hobbes, argues that without law or government to restrain them,
individuals would be free to use violence to satisfy their immediate material needs and desires
and would continually subdue others in order to maintain dominance over them. In taking this
stance on human nature, Hobbes deduces that an uninterrupted struggle for dominance leads to a
“war of all against all” in which everyone would be in constant fear of death since individuals
would be free to use lethal force to satisfy their needs and obtain their ends without
consequences. Hence, ‘society’ comes into existence only when individuals renounce violent
means to pursue their own ends and thus “contract” out of the state of nature into society in
exchange for security sustained by placing common rules at the disposal of a ruler who is
capable of restraining them all. (Ibid.; Morrison, 2006)
Whereas Hobbes’ analysis focused upon the lack of restraint in human nature, in The Social
Contract and Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, Jean-Jacques Rousseau concentrated on the
aspect of human nature in which jealousy and envy prevail. As such, as soon as society begins to
develop in the creation of common social rules, it tends to create private property favoring selfinterest. Under this view of human nature, Rousseau questioned how a ‘common interest’ arises
to replace individual self-interest. His analysis showed that a common interest arises only when
human beings subordinate their individual will to the ‘general will’, thus creating the conditions
of society. For Rousseau, this general will is formed by individuals pooling their own distinct
separate wills together. When this occurs, a transformation takes place in the nature of individual
will to the extent that the individuals involved become subject to the totality formed by their
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common union and thus the general will “receives its unity” as the collective will of society as
the source of moral and collective authority. (Rousseau, 1967: 18-19; Morrison, 2006)
With both positions of possessive individualism stated, it is now possible to turn to Durkheim’s
position. Durkheim treats Hobbes and Rousseau specifically in two places within his essay on
Rousseau’s Social Contract, which was drafted after a course given at the University of
Bordeaux and within The Rules of Sociological Method (1984:121-124, 142-144).
Durkheim sees that Hobbes constitutes the social bond through the voluntary submission “to an
absolute sovereign in order to avoid the horrors of the state of war [… but what is problematic is
that it] does not explain all details of social organization.” (Durkheim, 1960: 136) Although
Hobbes highlights the restraining capacity of society, the emphasis placed on the individual as
the source of the social bond and therefore the individual as the source of social restraint when
they contract out of nature is problematic. This leads to the view that individuals are naturally
resistant to society and comply with it only when they are compelled by the force of an external
ruler and the restraint inherent in law; which is to say that there is no indigenous regulation, only
imposed regulation. Under Hobbes, if society is only an association serving ends dictated by
individuals, then individuals must create society and the individual has to be persuaded to
comply with social rules by an appeal to their interest in self-preservation. But, this is
insufficient; as Durkheim writes in Rules, “the instinct of self-preservation did not come by itself
and without cause to fertilize this first germ of specialization.” (1982: 122) Rather, for
Durkheim, restraint is nothing more than a byproduct of individual will which is added
incrementally to social reality and was imposed externally by society independent of the
individual, thus arguing that restraint springs from collective life, a form of indigenous
regulation.
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In regard to Rousseau, Durkheim writes,
“[There is] an increasing effort to root the social being in nature. But therein lies the
weakness of the system. While, as we have shown, social life for Rousseau is not
contrary to the natural order, it has so little in common with nature that one wonders how
it is possible. Rousseau says somewhere that respect for the legislator's authority
presupposes a certain social spirit. But his remark applies still more to the establishment
of a society. If, however, a society is formed of isolated, atomized individuals, one is at a
loss to see where it comes from. Perhaps if Rousseau had granted a Hobbesian state of
war we might understand why, with a view to ending it, men should organize into a body
and go so far as to recast their original nature. But he cannot advance this explanation
because in his view the state of war is a result of life in common. And just as he fails to
explain how social life, even in its imperfect historical forms, could come into being, he
has great difficulty in showing how it can possibly cast off its imperfections and establish
itself on a logical basis.”(Durkheim, 1960: 137)
From this, it is clear that Durkheim holds a great deal of respect for Rousseau as his view of
society parallels Rousseau’s in many aspects but he rejected, as he did with Hobbes, Rousseau’s
tendency to ultimately derive society from the individual – a methodological position. For
Durkheim, Rousseau used a method which started from individual disposition in order to arrive
at social subject matter. By relying on philosophical and idealist concepts of individualist
natures, Rousseau’s concept of the individual was able to appear morally and organically
complete without society. But for Durkheim, this account of the emergence of society is
unsatisfactory and insufficient; it ignores that the collective structure of society, including
morality, is separate from the individual and therefore the individual could not be complete
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without society. This methodological possessive individualism sees its downfall directly in
Rules, where Durkheim writes,
“Neither Hobbes nor Rousseau appear to have noticed the complete contradiction that
exists in admitting that the individual is himself the creator of a machine whose essential
role is to exercise domination and constraint over him. Alternatively, it may have seemed
to them that, in order to get rid of this contradiction, it was sufficient to conceal it from
the eyes of its victims by the skilful device of the social contract.” (1982: 142)
For Durkheim, Hobbes and Rousseau see society’s existence and formation as a mere
“conventional arrangement, with no link at all in reality.” (1982: 143) By logical extension, this
is to suggest that by conventional arrangement, society can suddenly be undone and that is an
untenable position, not only for Durkheim but for reason itself.
Utilitarian Individualism
The utilitarian strain of methodological individualism differs from possessive individualism in
that possessive individualism recognized the significance of society but saw the individual as its
point of origin. Primarily advocated by John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham, it had become an
influential doctrine by the second half of the nineteenth century, placing the individual at the
center of social life. Unlike the notion of human nature presented by Hobbes and Rousseau, the
utilitarian notion of human nature asserted that individuals act on their own free will and are
completely autonomous and self-determined. What follows from this is a theory of human
motivation where individuals share common motives of utility which incite them to realize their
self-interest by the pursuit of private economic gain. Under this premise, individual social action
is based on economic interchanges of utility within society, but beyond this the individual has no
obligation to society otherwise; meaning that the larger context of social rules outside the
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individual were historically and socially irrelevant because society and its collective existence is
reduced to the spontaneous actions, decisions and attitudes of individuals. (Macpherson, 1962)
In this regard, Durkheim’s respect for Rousseau did not extend to this utilitarian strain; while
clarifying his position on Rousseau and Kant in his essay “Individualism and the Intellectuals”,
he wrote that “it would be quite pointless to move heaven and earth […] to combat an enemy that
is in the process of quietly dying a natural death. ” Although Durkheim developed a more
intricate critique within The Division of Labor (1984: 194-195; 220-221) and within Rules (1982:
67), how he sets the utilitarian strain aside in this essay is far more succinct:
“There is a preliminary ambiguity which must be cleared up first of all. In order to
facilitate the condemnation of individualism, it has been confused with the narrow
utilitarianism and utilitarian egoism of Spencer and the economists. This is to take the
easy way out. It is not hard, in effect, to denounce as an ideal without grandeur that
narrow commercialism which reduces society to nothing more than a vast apparatus of
production and exchange, and it is only too clear that all social life would be impossible
if there did not exist interests superior to the interests of individuals.” (Durkheim, 1973;
Lukes, 1969: 20)
In this sense then, utilitarian individualism is the tendency to reduce society to the economic acts
of individuals. In regard to the source of restraint that concerned Hobbes and Rousseau, the
utilitarian position considers it only insofar as restraint is of utility; For Durkheim, this position
overlooks the existence of the larger framework of social rules and the immediate social
obligations that acted as restraints on individuals. For the utilitarian position to ignore this, it is
also to ignore how society is always prior to the individual historically and thus cannot locate the
power to impose an external limit on individuals by individuals since, according to Durkheim,
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individuals are not analytically separable from society in the sociological, and therefore
economic, sense since economies operate as part of a total social and collective whole. Given
this, insofar as society precedes the individual historically and exists as an objective structure,
the scientific study of society is possible without taking into account the individuals’ separate
attitudes and dispositions. (Lukes, 1973: 3-16; Morrison, 2006)
Durkheim’s Individualism: Moral Individualism as a Historical Social Fact
With the two positions on methodological individualism, that of possessive individualism and
utilitarian individualism, clearly stated along with Durkheim’s critiques, it is now evident that
the concept of individualism Durkheim develops throughout his work is analytically distinct
from the theories of human nature/methodological individualism present in the history of
philosophy and economic theory. In order to illustrate how that concept of individualism is
analytically distinct from Durkheim’s theory of human nature and therefore his concept of the
‘social’ individual, it is necessary to briefly demonstrate how his argument concerning
individualism is an argument in regard to historical social facts and not his concept of human
nature. Thus, in The Division of Labor (1984) as Durkheim is trying to give the division of labor
a sociological explanation rather than a purely economic explanation, he has little choice but to
talk about the ebbs and flows of history. In doing so, he demonstrates that moral individualism is
a historical social fact by examining the individual historically in two respects: (1) in regard to
the transition from mechanical to organic solidarity where the autonomy of the individual slowly
increased; and in regard to the concept of the ‘individual’ from the point of view of social
development in different societies.
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The Autonomy of the Individual in the Transition from Mechanical to Organic Solidarity
For Durkheim, this historical transition from mechanical to organic solidarity increased the
autonomy of the individual. This means that in societies integrated by mechanical solidarity, the
individual was not a conspicuous social unit. Rather, individuality must have been at its lowest
point of development because the ‘pressure’ exerted upon the individual by the common
religious practices was so great that it tended to absorb all individual differences and purposes
into collective purposes. If mechanical solidarity is the stage at which the individual is
‘subordinated’ to the collective forces of society, then organic solidarity must mark the
beginning of individual separateness and autonomy. This can take place only when the pressure
exerted by the common beliefs and practices are diminished. Hence, according to Durkheim’s
reasoning, ‘individuals’ must have first made their appearance in society in the form of the chief
or leader of the tribe. This is sensible because to become distinct from the social mass and to
become the first autonomous individuals is to first to differentiate oneself from the collectivity.
At this level of solidarity, a leader is required to be separate from the undifferentiated tribal mass
in order for their authority to carry any weight. This separation for the collectivity puts them
beyond others and positions the leader to have a certain distinctness of experience relative to the
collectivity. This and their leadership responsibilities confers individuality upon them, making
them distinct from others. (1984: 143) Thus, it is the power of chiefs that makes them
autonomous and capable of activity beyond the collective norm; and it is this that opens up the
possibility of personal initiative, and constitutes the first moment when the individual steps forth
from the group as someone distinct from its collectivity. As mechanical solidarity transitions to
organic solidarity, autonomy is no longer limited to being identified with leaders. As the change
in social cohesion reduces the intensity of the social attachments existing between society and
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the individual, as a direct product of industrial society, this increased autonomy led to the rise of
‘individualism’. (Durkheim, 1984: 121; Cf. Lukes, 1973: 52-58)
The ‘Individual’ and Social Development in Different Societies
Durkheim’s analysis suggests that in segmental societies, where the individual tended to be
absorbed in collective life, the links to society tended to be direct and the exerted social control
was repressive. Under these conditions, when the force of social links began to weaken the bond
between the individual and society, individuals became the recipients of rights and freedoms in
which their ties to society were expressed indirectly. Thus, as industrial societies developed,
adjustments in social solidarity changed the overall nature of the social mass, and this
encouraged the development of individual autonomy in a number of ways: (1) Individuals were
generally freed from the claims which society placed upon them in the form of social allegiances.
As a result, beliefs and customs, which previously were not directly part of social life, began to
develop. (2) As the social density of society grew, individual ideas began to dominate over
collective ones. This stretched social life beyond the limits set by previous beliefs and moral
rules. (1984: 115-117; 122) (3) As the division of labor accelerated, individuals were placed
within a framework of causes which connected them to their own needs and wants rather than to
the needs of society or the needs of others. This encouraged individual appetites and created the
need for exploration and initiative. (1984: 117-118) (4) As the population increased, social
activity, grew more varied and created a more differentiated social life. (1984: 119-121) (5)
Changes occurring in the dependence of the individual on society as a whole brought about new
activity, giving rise to ‘modes of thinking and feeling’ which became developed to an extent
never before seen in human society. (1984: 121) (6) As societies developed in their division of
labor, they became more condensed and this caused one form of ‘psychological life’ to disappear
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and be replaced by another. Initially, individual differences started out by being subordinated to
collective forces, but as societies developed a psychological life appeared, and this in turn
transformed the psychological life of society. (1984: 130) For Durkheim, given this, society
itself became freer and more extensive. Then as the social density of the population is increased,
personal bonds become rare and weak and, in this case, individuals lose sight of one another
other and thus lose interest. (1984: 201) As this mutual indifference grows it results in a loss of
collective surveillance and the sphere of free autonomous action of each individual is extended in
scope and, in fact, becomes a right.’ (Cf. 1984: 85-87) As a result, the collective conscience
begins to lose its hold over the individual and becomes more vague, ambiguous and
indeterminate. When this happens, collective social rules lose their clarity and due to the
increasing density of the population, the center of social life shifts; individuals no longer live at
the center of social life as it becomes spread over a much larger territory. (1984: 135-137) Under
these conditions, public opinion has less of an effect on the individual and exerts less constraint.
Hence, as the collective grip of society over the individual loosens, there is more individual
divergence. Under these conditions, the only collective representation left for the establishment
of morality is the social fact that we are individual human beings and this equates to the rise of
the cult of the individual:
“As all the other beliefs and practices assume less and less religious a character, the
individual becomes the object of a sort of religion. We carry on the worship of the dignity
of the human person.” (Durkheim, 1984: 122)
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This is what has been referred to as Durkheim’s moral individualism2 and is now shown to be a
historical social fact. (Cf. Giddens, 1971; Marske, 1987; Cladis, 1992) This historical argument
coincides with Durkheim’s demonstration that the division of labor becomes the link supporting
the cult of the individual in societies increasingly organized by organic solidarity. (Durkheim,
1984: 123) So, now that Durkheim’s critiques, along with his statement on the development of
the cult of the individual as moral individualism are illustrated, the argument can now proceed to
illustrate how Durkheim’s concept of the ‘social’ individual, which is hinted throughout his
work, is different from the already presented positions.
Durkheim’s Theory of Human Nature and the Social Individual
At times, throughout his work, Durkheim appears to be struggling with the relationship between
psychology, philosophy and sociology. From Durkheim’s work on education, his position on
psychology could be summarized as the ‘sociology of personality’ while his more well known
work in sociology, including his thematic sociology of morals, studied sociology as the
relationship between the individual and society. As already shown, Durkheim’s main focus is
demonstrating the basis of morality in collective representations, which, based on the division of
labor, has now historically arrived at moral individualism in lieu of a collective consciousness
integrated by mechanical solidarity. However, this is not the concept of the ‘social’ individual as
found within his theory of human nature. This is the difference between society as the object of
analysis where the individual is slowly expressed historically in regard to the transition from
mechanical to organic solidarity and the conception of the relation between a human being and

Also directly on this point, in The Determination of Moral Facts, Durkheim writes “Thus very
far from there being the antagonism between the individual and society which is often claimed,
moral individualism, the cult of the individual, is in fact the product of society itself. It is society
that instituted it and made of man the god whose servant it is.” (Durkheim, 1953: 29)
2
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the manner in which social solidarity is generally realized in a human being, considered
philosophically. What is now required is a demonstration of how this theory is hinted at
throughout Durkheim’s corpus until its full statement in “The Dualism of Human Nature and Its
Social Conditions” and the tension found within Rules considering the “individual as an infinity”
at the nexus of coercive social facts.
This argument demands evidence and the time of demonstration is finally here to show what
portions of The Division of Labor in Society, Rules of Sociological Method, Suicide, The
Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, Sociology and Philosophy and Education and Sociology
hint at Durkheim’s theory of human nature upon which his concept of the ‘social’ individual is
based:
1. “With man it is completely different, because the societies he creates are much larger;
even the smallest we know of are more extensive than most animal societies. Being more
complex, they are also more changeable, and the conjuncture of these two causes results
in social life among human beings not becoming fixed in a biological form. Even where it
is most simple, it retains its specificity. There are always beliefs and practices that are
common to men but that are not innate in them. But this characteristic becomes
accentuated as social elements and social density increase. The greater the number of
people associated together, the more they react upon one another; the more also the
product of these reactions flows out beyond the organism. Man is thus subjected to
causes sui generis, whose relative share in the constitution of human nature becomes ever
more important.” (Durkheim, 1984: 283)
2. “Yet our thought would be singularly misinterpreted if the conclusion was drawn from
the previous remarks that sociology, in our view, should not even take into account man
Raphael 14

and his faculties. On the contrary, it is clear that the general characteristics of human
nature play their part in the work of elaboration from which social life results. But it is
not these which produce it or give it its special form, they only make it possible.
Collective representations, emotions and tendencies have not as their causes certain states
of consciousness in individuals, but the conditions under which the body social as a
whole exists. Doubtless these can be realized only if individual natures are not opposed to
them. But these are simply the indeterminate matter which the social factor fashions and
transforms. Their contribution is made up exclusively of very general states, vague and
thus malleable predispositions which of themselves could not assume the definite and
complex forms which characterize social phenomena, if other agents did not intervene.
(Durkheim, 1982: 130-131)
3. “To be sure in so far as we are solidary with the group and share its life, we are exposed
to their influence; but so far as we have a distinct personality of our own we rebel against
and try to escape them. Since everyone leads this sort of double existence simultaneously,
each of us has a double impulse. We are drawn in a social direction and tend to follow the
inclinations of our own natures. So the rest of society weighs upon us as a restraint to our
centrifugal tendencies, and we for our part share in this weight upon others for the
purpose of neutralizing theirs. We ourselves undergo the pressure we help to exert upon
others.” (Durkheim, 1951: 318-319)
4. “Human nature is the result of a sort of recasting of the animal nature, and in the course
of the various complex operations which have brought about this recasting, there have
been losses as well as gains. How many instincts have we not lost? The reason for this is
that men are not only in relations with the physical environment, but also with a social
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environment infinitely more extended, more stable and more active than the one whose
influence animals undergo. To live, they must adapt themselves to this. Now in order to
maintain itself, society frequently finds it necessary that we should see things from a
certain angle and feel them in a certain way; consequently it modifies the ideas which we
would ordinarily make of them for ourselves and the sentiments to which we would be
inclined if we listened only to our animal nature; it alters them, even going so far as to
put the contrary sentiments in their place. Does it not even go so far as to make us regard
our own individual lives as something of little value, while for the animal this is the
greatest of things? Then it is a vain enterprise to seek to infer the mental constitution of
the primitive man from that of the higher animals.” (Durkheim, 1915: 66)
5. “When we said elsewhere that social facts are in a sense independent of individuals and
exterior to individual minds, we only affirmed of the social world what we have just
established for the psychic world. Society has for its substratum the mass of associated
individuals. The system which they form by uniting together, and which varies according
to their geographical disposition and the nature and number of their channels of
communication, is the base from which social life is raised. The representations which
form the network of social life arise from the relations between the individuals thus
combined or the secondary groups that are between the individuals and the total society.
If there is nothing extraordinary in the fact that individual representations, produced by
the action and reaction between neural elements, are not inherent in these elements, there
is nothing surprising in the fact that collective representations, produced by the action and
reaction between individual minds that form the society, do not derive directly from the
latter and consequently surpass them. The conception of the relationship which unites the
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social substratum and the social life is at every point analogous to that which undeniably
exists between the physiological substratum and the psychic life of individuals, if, that is,
one is not going to deny the existence of psychology in the proper sense of the word.”
(Durkheim, 1953: 10)
6. “It follows from the definition that precedes, that education consists of a methodical
socialization of the young generation. In each of us, it may be said, there exist two beings
which, while inseparable except by abstraction, remain distinct. One is made up of all the
mental states that apply only to ourselves and to the events of our personal lives: this is
what might be called the individual being. The other is a system of ideas, sentiments and
practices which express in us, not our personality, but the group or different groups of
which we are party these are religious beliefs, moral beliefs and practices, national or
professional traditions, collective opinions of every kind. Their totality forms the social
being. To constitute this being in each of us is the end of education.” (Durkheim, 1956:
72-73)
These six selections, although clearly written for different purposes and general topics, all deal
with the tension between the individual and society in regard to the relationship between
psychology, philosophy and sociology. However, despite their various textual usages are related
to Durkheim’s development of his sociology of morals, the referenced concept of the individual
or human nature is not strictly the one identified as subject to the conditions of any specific
society qualified by mechanical solidarity nor qualified by the modernity of organic solidarity
but a more general concept of the ‘social’ individual. This concept of the ‘social’ individual has
the same form wherever and whenever it is found; it is the content that qualifies this form that is
subject to change and variation. This is most clearly stated within “The Dualism of Human
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Nature and Its Social Conditions” (1973 [1914]: 149-166) where this tension in Durkheim’s
struggle between psychology, philosophy and sociology reaches its climax and release as
Durkheim starts off by admitting the following:
“Although Sociology is defined as the science of societies, it cannot, in reality, deal with
the human groups that are the immediate object of its investigation without eventually
touching on the individual who is the basic element of which these groups are composed.
For society can exist only if it penetrates the consciousness of individuals and fashions it
in "its image and resemblance." We can say, therefore, with assurance and without being
excessively dogmatic, that a great number of our mental states, including some of the
most important ones, are of social origin.” (1973 [1914]: 149)
While it might be obvious that this is to identify the ‘social’ relation between the individual and
society, for Durkheim, this admission is an attempt to finally settle the problems posed by his
social realism inherent in his attempt to distinguish social facts from physical, biological, and
individual psychological facts about a decade earlier in The Rules of Sociological Method. In
specifying sociology’s fundamental empirical object of social facts, Durkheim had defined social
facts as ‘things’ that are “every way of acting, fixed or not, capable of exercising on the
individual an external constraint; or again, every way of acting which is general throughout a
given society, while at the same time existing in its own right independent of its individual
manifestations.” (Durkheim, 1982: 59, 60) The key implication of this definition is that social
facts only exist as such among other social facts, implying that members are interdependent and
social facts are generally effective only within an order of a plurality of such facts. At the time,
under this definition, it was not altogether clear that social individuals had any relevance for
Durkheim. By starting his essay with the admission that we must deal with “the individual who
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is the basic element of which these groups are composed”, Durkheim is framing his argument as
an attempt to settle this issue.
Durkheim goes on to say that “To look for the causes and conditions upon which civilization
depends is, therefore, to seek out also the causes and conditions of what is most specifically
human in man. And so sociology, which draws on psychology and could not do without it, brings
to it, in a just return, a contribution that equals and surpasses in importance the services that it
receives from it. It is only by historical analysis that we can discover what makes up man, since
it is only in the course of history that he is formed.” (1973 [1914]: 149-150) This appears to
suggest an explanation as to why moral individualism seems to be confused with his theory of
human nature, because it is a historical argument. But then Durkheim goes historically abstract:
“In every age, man has been intensely aware of this duality. He has, in fact, everywhere
conceived of himself as being formed of two radically heterogeneous beings: the body and the
soul.” (Op. cit.:150) This not only situates his argument as a presentation of the underlying
argument presented in The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life but also in a much older
debate concerning human nature, which appears to only further obfuscate his concept of the
‘social’ individual for the moment. But, as this discussion of the dualism of body and soul
proceeds, Durkheim re-frames this distinction by considering as a hint that finds something
universal about human nature and its expression as the elementary form of social life given its
consistent presence ‘that men in all known civilizations have experienced’. Durkheim re-asserts
the body-soul distinction as a distinction of polar opposites: between (1) sensation and sensory
tendencies; and (2) conceptual thought and moral activity. He corresponds sensation and sensory
tendencies to the personal and conceptual thought and moral activity to the impersonal, stating
that, “The old formula homo duplex is therefore verified by the facts. Far from being simple, our
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inner life has something that is like a double center of gravity. On the one hand is our
individuality—and, more particularly, our body in which it is based; on the other is everything in
us that expresses something other than ourselves.”3 (Op. cit.:152) To this end, he argues that “the
traditional antithesis of the body and soul is not a vain mythological concept that is without
foundation in reality” but one that “the science of man must try to account for”. (Op. cit.: 154)
Durkheim then proceeds to nominate two theories of human nature for elimination: empirical
monism and idealistic monism; the two doctrines that called the ‘duality of man an illusion.’
After a brief discussion, in Durkheim using his style of argument by elimination, he simply states
that since these two positions do not actually deal with the problem and therefore do not attempt
to solve it, “the only remaining ones that are valid and merit examination are those which limit
themselves to affirming the fact that must be explained, but which do not account for it.” (Op.
cit.: 157) This leaves Durkheim with two proposals to consider: (1) that of the “ontological
explanation for which Plato gave the formula. Man is double because two worlds meet in him:
that of non-intelligent and amoral matter.” (2) That of “the existence of two antithetical faculties
within us. We possess both a faculty for thinking as individuals and a faculty for thinking in
universal and impersonal terms. The first is called sensitivity, and the second reason.” This is
most commonly associated with Kant. He eliminates these by outlining the underlying argument
presented in The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life considering the basis of collective
representations:

Relative to Durkheim’s critiques of methodological individualism and moral individualism,
before going further, based on the discussion so far, regardless of how Durkheim’s concept of
the ‘social’ individual is fully realized, the notion of the analytical distinctiveness of this concept
in Durkheim’s corpus, even in its partially presented form has already proven to be self-evident.
3
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“In brief, this duality corresponds to the double existence that we lead concurrently: the
one purely individual and rooted in our organisms, the other social and nothing but an
extension of society. The origin of the antagonism that we have described is evident from
the very nature of the elements involved in it. The conflicts of which we have given
examples are between the sensations and the sensory appetites, on the one hand, and the
intellectual and moral life, on the other; and it is evident that passions and egoistic
tendencies derive from our individual constitutions, while our rational activity—whether
theoretical or practical—is dependent on social causes. We have often had occasion to
prove that the rules of morality are norms that have been elaborated by society; the
obligatory character with which they are marked is nothing but the authority of society,
communicating itself to everything that comes from it. In the book that is the occasion of
the present study but which we can only mention here, we have tried to demonstrate that
concepts, the material of all logical thought, were originally collective representations.
The impersonality that characterizes them is proof that they are the product of an
anonymous and impersonal action. We have even found a basis for conjecturing that the
fundamental and lofty concepts that we call categories are formed on the model of social
phenomena.” (Op. cit.:162)
From this it is not only clear that his concept of the ‘social’ individual is analytically distinct
from methodological individualism and from the historical social fact of moral individualism,
but that his theory of human nature is also analytically distinct in the history of philosophy. This
is a mere bonus. Now, Durkheim’s conception might be summarized by the pseudo-equation:

The Social Individual = Biophysical Being + Social Being.
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This conception does not conflict with Durkheim’s conception of social facts where he states that
to “attempt an inventory of all the characteristics peculiar to an individual, is an insoluble
problem. Every individual is an infinity, and infinity cannot be exhausted.” (Durkheim, 1982:
110) Rather, this conception, at least attempts to solve the problem by not reducing social reality
to a mere epiphenomenon of individual psychology but by realizing the collective aspect in
which that infinity is realized and considering that aspect the ‘social’ element of the individual.
In this regard, in the relation between the individual and society, Durkheim concludes “The
Dualism of Human Nature” by taking on the tension between infinity and its collective aspect:
“There is no doubt that if society were only the natural and spontaneous development of
the individual, these two parts of ourselves would harmonize and adjust to each other
without clashing and without friction: the first part, since it is only the extension and, in a
way, the complement of the second, would encounter no resistance from the latter. In
fact, however, society has its own nature, and, consequently, its requirements are quite
different from those of our nature as individuals: the interests of the whole are not
necessarily those of the part. Therefore, society cannot be formed or maintained without
our being required to make perpetual and costly sacrifices.” (1973 [1914]: 163)
This identifies the source of many social problems and conflicts in the denial of accepting a
Durkheimian conception of human nature as those who hold the possessive or utilitarian view of
individualism are unwilling to “do violence to certain of our strongest inclinations” (Ibid.) in
recognizing that as “society surpasses us, it obliges us to surpass ourselves; and to surpass itself,
a being must, to some degree, depart from its nature.” (Ibid.) Thus, in everyday life it is
important to recognize that Durkheim’s concept of the ‘social’ individual helps illuminate how
social life itself is possible. This is even more so, during times of great personal challenges, as it
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reminds us that everyday problems of social life and more general social problems are not just
the problem of independent human beings but problems of a collectivity; the main disagreement
is who gets to be a member of that collective.
Beyond Durkheim Own Writings
Now that that analytical distinctiveness of Durkheim’s concept of the ‘social’ individual is
sufficiently achieved, the intellectual question that remains is what is the significance of it? What
does this mean for Durkheim’s sociology and how Durkheim is read? Does this lead to reevaluations of Durkheim many concepts and their contemporary applications relative to
education, law, religion, labor and the family? However, to answer beyond the affirmative is
another argument entirely; rather the more practical implication is whether collective
representations as realized in the ‘social’ individual can be seen as a precursor, if not a classical
theoretical basis for developing a cognitive sociology based upon our social nature and its
relationship to the contemporary sociological literature. That is the notion that motivated this
inquiry into Durkheim’s concept of the ‘social’ individual.
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